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instrumental variables to handle the causality problem. A central result is that legal structure and security of 
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  11.   Introduction 
 
Social capital, defined here as generalized trust,1 has several advantageous consequences. 
Numerous studies suggest that social capital in some form is beneficial for economic growth 
(Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; Dasgupta and 
Sergaldin 2000; Glaeser et al. 2000; Zak and Knack 2001; Knack and Zak 2002; Beugelsdijk, de 
Groot, and van Schaik 2004; Bengtsson, Berggren, and Jordahl 2005), but also, to mention some 
other areas, for trade (Greif 1989; Woolcock 1998, p. 158; den Butter and Mosch 2003), happiness 
(Uslaner 2002, ch. 8; Bjørnskov 2003), democratic stability (Inglehart 1999; Uslaner 2003, p. 177), 
political and civic involvement (Knack and Keefer 1997, p. 1255; La Porta et al. 1997), crime 
prevention (Wilson 1987), and health (Putnam 2000, pp. 226−35; Rose 2000). With that many 
advantages − perhaps within reach − the issue of how social capital is and can be generated was 
bound to arise. 
The present query adds to the emerging literature that tries to explain how social capital is 
formed. One strand of that literature, called “society-centered” by Hooghe and Stolle (2003, p. 
3), focuses on the role culture and social interactions, such as membership in voluntary 
associations, play.2 Another strand, to which we belong and which is still, in its empirical parts, 
quite novel, attempts to locate the determinants of social capital – interpreted as generalized 
trust – in contemporary institutional factors and policies.3 Most of the studies in this literature 
have not really looked at factors relating to economic institutions and policies, with the exception 
of the institutions of the rule of law and perhaps also income equality. We consider this a major 
shortcoming. Hence, we look at a wider group of economic institutions and policies that are 
connected to each other: size of government, legal structure and security of property rights, 
access to sound money, freedom to exchange with foreigners, and regulation of credit, labor, 
                                                 
1 On the definition of social capital, see e.g. Coleman (1990), Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), Levi (1998), Paldam 
(2000), Zak and Knack (2001, p. 306), Rothstein and Stolle (2002, 2003), and Hooghe and Stolle (2003, p. 2).  
2 Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) can be said to belong to this strand. 
3 The need for more and the importance of “institution-centered” research in the study of social capital is stressed by 
e.g. Levi (1998), Sobel (2002, p. 147), Hooghe and Stolle (2003, pp. 7−8, 240), and Uslaner (2003, p. 172 ff.). 
  2and business (the five areas of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index, EFI). Our general 
hypothesis is that there is a positive effect of economic freedom on trust.4  
Arguments to the contrary have been proffered, e.g. that commercialism erodes civic assets 
such as social capital (for a survey, see Hirschman 1982) and that even if there is an element of 
trust in commercial activities, it does not extend to other contexts (see e.g. Uslaner 2000, pp. 5, 
141−48). One could also cite Coleman (1990, p. 317) who characterizes social capital as a public 
good being produced suboptimally in markets; but here the effect is still thought to be positive, 
albeit insufficient. In the end, it is an empirical issue whether economic freedom is beneficial or 
detrimental for the development of trust and to what degree. 
We run cross-country regressions, encompassin g  5 1  o r  5 2  c o u n t r i e s  ( d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  
model specification) to explain trust in 1995 or 2000. The EFI is used as a measurement of the 
degree to which a country’s economy is free, and the variable Generalized trust from the new 
version of the World Values Survey is used to measure social capital. Our results indicate that 
especially one area of economic freedom – Legal structure and security of property rights (EFI2) 
– promotes trust. But we also find that Access to sound money (EFI3) and Regulation of credit, 
labor, and business (EFI5) sometimes have a positive, statistically significant effect (depending 
on the model specification). 
One of our contributions to the literature consists of paying particular attention to the 
methodological problem of causality, which is unresolved in previous studies.5 We try to come 
to terms with the issue of whether EFI2 influences trust by using instrumental variables.  
 
 
2.   Some Trust-Building Market Mechanisms 
 
One can distinguish between particularized trust and generalized trust.6 To put it briefly, 
the former entails trusting people you know or know something about; the latter trusting most 
                                                 
4 Cf. Bruni and Sugden (2000), where the views of David Hume and Adam Smith to this effect are presented. 
5 This is a major problem for the existing empirical literature, as pointed out by e.g. Durlauf (1999, 2002), Zack and 
Knack (2001, p. 314), and by Hooghe and Stolle (2003, p. 244): “[E]vidence for causality remains tenuous.” 
6 Knack and Keefer (1997) use the related terms specific trust and anonymous trust, whereas Uslaner (2002, ch. 2) 
prefers the somewhat-less-related terms strategic trust and moralistic trust. 
  3(but not all) people you do not know or know anything about. Hence, particularized trust has to 
d o  w i t h  p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  c o n c r e t e  p e r s o n s :  y o u  k n o w  t h a t  s o m e  p e o p l e  c a n  b e  t r u s t e d  
because they have been honest and have fulfilled their promises.7 Through this knowledge, 
transaction costs relating to the persons you trust are reduced, which stimulates further 
exchange.  
It is quite easy to see how particularized trust can arise in a free economy.8 There is both 
an incentive and mechanisms for trust to emerge between economic actors. The incentive stems 
from the fact that producers strive towards high long-term profits and that trustworthiness is 
generally conducive to the generation of such profits. All else equal, a product or service that 
consumers perceive to be offered in conjunction with an assurance of implicit or explicit 
contract adherence meets higher demand than a product or service without such an assurance. 
Likewise, customers must make it credible that they are able to fulfill their side of the bargain 
and provide payments in a reliable manner. Generally, this could be described as a willingness 
both by producers and consumers to secure outcomes that are mutually beneficial and to avoid 
suboptimal outcomes in which cheating occurs due to a lack of trust (Klein 2002, pp. 172–73; 
Güth and Ockenfels 2003).  
There are different mechanisms for assuring that others find a person or a firm 
trustworthy. The more actual or potential competition there is between economic actors, the 
better these mechanisms work. They all basically relate to having, obtaining, or sharing 
information – naturally when actors are identifiable but also, in many cases, in many-person 
settings with a high degree of (albeit not complete) anonymity between actors.9 Some 
mechanisms relate to direct knowledge about a person or a firm, oftentimes stemming from 
extended, continuous dealings. Such dealings are facilitated by such things as brand names and 
franchise operations, which enable consumers to shop for the same product or service in 
manifold places with just about the same assurance of trustworthiness. Other mechanisms relate 
                                                 
7 See Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994), Offe (1999), Klein (2000, p. 1 ff.) and Hardin (2002). 
8 By a “free economy” we mean an economy characterized by a relatively small government, the rule of law and 
private property rights, monetary stability, free trade and free capital flows, and a relatively low degree of regulation. 
9 The existence of competition is important because it implies that actors are subject to a disciplinary mechanism as 
other actors (unlike in, say, a Prisoners’ Dilemma) can select with whom to interact – based on the available 
information. On this point, see Tullock (1985) and Hörner (2003), who provides a formal analysis. 
  4to indirect knowledge about the economic history and status of a person or a firm, obtainable 
from e.g. seals-of-approval firms, credit-card companies, consumer groups, authorities, and 
credit-information companies. There are also middlemen that create a bridge of trust between 
two traders (Landa 1994), as well as word of mouth (Alexander 1987) and other reputational 
mechanisms. Reputation as a central mechanism for obtaining socially desirable behavior has 
been discussed frequently in the classical economics literature, as evinced by e.g. Smith (1978, p. 
538): “A dealer is afraid of losing his character, and is scrupulous in observing every 
engagement. When a person makes perhaps 20 contracts in a day, he cannot gain so much by 
endeavouring to impose on his neighbours, as the very appearance of a cheat would make him 
lose.”10  
Given the manifold existence of particularized trust in a free economy, it is not 
unreasonable to think that there is also a great deal of generalized trust flourishing in such a 
setting. Why can this be expected to be the case? 
A well-functioning free economy has as distinguishing features the rule of law and the 
protection of private property rights. These institutions reinforce a climate of trust in making 
sure that breakers of contracts and rules are brought to justice. As Rothstein (2000) puts it: 
 
In a civilized society, institutions of law and order have one particularly important task: to 
detect and punish people who are “traitors”, that is, those who break contracts, steal, murder 
and do other such non-cooperative things and therefore should not be trusted. Thus, if you think 
(i.e., if your cognitive map is) that these particular institutions do what they are supposed to do 
in a fair and effective manner, then you also have reason to believe that the chance people have 
of getting away with such treacherous behavior is small. If so, you will believe that people will 
have very good reason to refrain from acting in a treacherous manner, and you will therefore 
believe that “most people can be trusted.”11 
                                                 
10 Cf. Hume (1978, p. 522). For a further treatment of this topic, see Klein (1997, 2000, 2002), with e.g. more detailed 
examples of assurance mechanisms; Curzon Prize (1997) discusses similar mechanisms in the context of international 
trade. Cf. Coleman (1990) and McCloskey (1994, p. 186). For a game-theoretic approach, see Binmore (1992, pp. 
347−82).  
11 Cf. Misztal (1996), Cohen (1997), Levi (1998), Offe (1999), Alesina and Ferrara (2002), Rothstein and Stolle (2002), 
and Rothstein (2003). The latter outlines a related mechanism. It is not only because people know that treacherous 
behavior will be punished and that it is therefore rare that they trust others; through the existence of what they 
  5 
Furthermore, Güth and Ockenfels (2003) demonstrate, by means of an evolutionary model, that 
if anonymous interaction prevents a detection of what type of person one is potentially dealing 
with, then legal institutions may play a decisive role for the formation of trust. They point out 
that courts can promote trust and thus serve as a substitute for reputation and other such 
mechanisms, especially in more anonymous contexts. 
This points at an institutional determinant (among others) of generalized trust and yields 
the following hypothesis: The stronger the rule of law and the protection of property rights (the 
basis of a market economy), the higher the degree of generalized trust, all else held constant.12  
A high-quality legal framework, then, seems able to bring about generalized trust directly. 
But it may also do so indirectly, and in two ways, by stimulating market activities that bring 
about mechanisms that help establish particularized trust that extends into generalized trust.13  
On the one hand, as noted by Güth and Ockenfels (2003), these mechanisms can themselves 
be seen as alternatives to a high-quality legal system: they are informal institutions that help 
people trust others generally because they know that treacherous people are likely to have been 
recorded in some formal or informal way and that this also has a deterring effect on 
opportunists. This refers to the ability to find information (through established organizations or 
through reputational mechanisms) about others even when one has had no previous contact or 
when no further contact is necessarily envisaged. Klein (2000, p. 110 ff., 2002) describes how “a 
system of seals of approval” or “a flowing patchwork of reputational nexuses” tends to develop 
which then renders trust the natural outlook of most people.  
On the other hand, particularized trust itself may extend into generalized trust. Putnam 
(1995, p. 169) refers to this as “the transitivity of trust.”14 How so? When one repeatedly trusts 
                                                                                                                                                              
perceive to be an impartial and fair judicial system, they also know that others do not bribe, threaten or in other ways 
corrupt this sphere of government. This insight generates generalized trust as well. 
12 Ho and Weigelt (2002) show experimentally that even without any formal mechanisms or little (if any) informal 
sanctions, there is evidence of trusting behavior among strangers. About 20 per cent of their population displayed 
such trust. A real-life setting, like a market economy, does have both formal mechanisms and informal sanctions – 
and hence, more such trust is to be expected.  
13 Uslaner’s (2000) objections to the contrary; but cf. Dasgupta (1988, pp. 64−5): “In dealing with someone you learn 
something not only about him, but also about others in his society,” Wilson (1998, p. 42 ff.) and Putnam (2000, pp. 
288-9). In the end, this is an empirical question, the answer to which we will return.  
  6people one has some knowledge about, one may develop a trustworthy outlook on other people 
as a matter of habit and unreflected internalization.15 Or one may make a rational decision to 
internalize moral principles to govern one’s choices. This latter idea has been developed by 
Gauthier (1986), to the effect that constrained maximization, i.e. maximization that precludes 
opportunistic behavior on the condition that others can be identified somewhat reliably as 
planning to avoid such behavior as well, yields higher individual and social net benefits.16 
Clearly, this is not to say that a habitual truster or a constrained maximizer is an automaton that 
indiscriminately trusts everyone in every situation in a gullible fashion. Rather, it means that 
one acts on the presumption that others are trustworthy unless there are distinct signs to the 
contrary.  
Such an ability to roughly assess the character of others is made possible by what Gauthier 
(1986, p. 174) refers to as the translucency of individuals (not as strict a requirement as 
transparency). There is evidence to the effect that people do indeed possess such an ability. 
Frank (1993) shows that involuntary “telltale signs” such as facial expressions and voice tone 
reveal intentions (albeit imperfectly) and make cooperation possible. Orbell and Dawes (1991), 
like Gauthier (1986), focus on translucency that enables actors to detect and interpret behavioral 
cues that reveal the intentions of a prospective partner.17  
Macy and Sato (2002) present a comparison of trust levels in Japan and the U.S. and point 
out that some social-capital theories would predict the former level to be higher than the latter. 
                                                                                                                                                              
14 As pointed out by Bruni and Sugden (2000), Hume (1978, p. 501) develops the argument that reputational effects 
can be transmitted from one context (respect for property) to another (promise-keeping). 
15 Cf. Hume (1975, p. 283), Karlson (1993, p. 93 ff.), and Vanberg (1995, p. 97 ff.). A precise mechanism along such 
lines for particularized trust to turn into generalized trust (or, as the authors call it, universal trust) is outlined in 
Macy and Skvoretz (1998). They use an evolutionary computational model to show how cooperation can emerge 
between strangers even without formal or informal social controls. Norms for trusting strangers emerge in local 
settings, in exchanges between neighbors, and spread through “weak ties” to outsiders.  
16 Straightforward maximizers can be blocked from interacting with the constrained maximizers through this 
possibility of identification. A somewhat related study, by Glaeser et al. (2000) finds that generalized trust, as 
revealed in one of their experiments, i s  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e s .  A  p e r s o n  w h o  h a d  b e n e f i t e d  f r o m  t h e  
generosity of an anonymous stranger or who had not lost something in the mail recently was willing to pay a larger 
amount of money for having an envelope containing ten dollars dropped at a public place with her address written 
on it. 
17 For further experimental evidence, see Ockenfels and Selten (2000) and Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2001). 
  7The reason is that Japan is a more close-knit and collectivist culture with denser networks. 
However, laboratory and survey studies show that the Americans trust each other more than 
the Japanese. A computational model indicates that higher (but not too high) social mobility in 
the U.S. may explain this fact, as people thereby learn how to interact effectively with 
newcomers. Americans tend not to focus on social or physical proximity as much but assess 
others on the basis of “telltale signs of character.” They proceed to trust if those signs indicate an 
honest interest in cooperation. Interestingly, high economic freedom implies an absence of 
impediments against mobility. Lastly, there are also evolutionary arguments about how a 
capacity to detect simulated reciprocal altruism has developed (Trivers 1971).  
The conjectures thus explicated can be summarized as in Figure 1. 

























Figure 1. Trust in a Free Economy 
 
First, there is a link from the institutions of a free economy, which make an actually free 
economy possible, to particularized and generalized trust, and the number 1 denotes the 
incentive and the mechanisms (the generation of information, aided by competition) that 
generate trust. Second, there is a direct link from the institutions of a free economy, in particular 
the legal structure and protection of property rights (EFI2), to generalized trust, for the reason 
expressed in the Rothstein quote above, here denoted by the number 2. Third, there is an 
additional, indirect mechanism for generalized trust to emerge in a free economy, denoted by 
the number 3, viz. the rational adoption of constrained maximization, in the sense of Gauthier, 
  8or the not-so-conscious adoption of an internalized, habitual trusting outlook on people in 
general.18 
What, more precisely, can be expected, on theoretical grounds, of the relationship between 
the five areas of economic freedom, on the one hand, and social capital qua generalized trust, on 
the other?  Size of government (EFI1) indicates the extent to which countries rely on individual 
choice and markets rather than the political process to allocate resources. When government 
spending increases relative to voluntary spending, government decision-making is substituted 
for personal choice and economic freedom is reduced, making market transactions, with their 
trust-enhancing qualities, more difficult. On the other hand, some government expenses (e.g. on 
the judicial system, police, defense, infrastructure, and education) can be expected to yield more 
trust. The net effect is unclear. Legal structure and security of property rights (EFI2) is essential for 
the formation of trust in providing a necessary framework for voluntary transactions to take 
place with confidence, by restricting the use of coercion. Interacting freely with others, and 
developing trust in them, hinges on being able to rely on a just and impartial system of 
protective government. Access to sound money (EFI3) refers to monetary stability and 
predictability that enable people to “trust” the value of money, which can be expected to be 
conducive to engaging in voluntary transactions and the usage of contracts. This usage, in turn, 
can generate trust through people being more prone to contract with others and, thereby, 
becoming willing and learning to have confidence in others (illustrated by the number 3 in 
Figure 1). Freedom to exchange with foreigners (EFI4) could reduce trust through the segmentation 
of society thought by some (Hirschman 1982; Bauman 1998) to follow from globalization. 
However, a positive effect is envisaged in the Montesquieuean doux commerce thesis, to the effect 
that trade and commerce has a civilizing effect on manners and mores: people who trade with 
strangers realize that they can be trusted too. Again, the net effect is unclear. Lastly, Regulation of 
credit, labor, and business (EFI5) might promote trust if it raises the costs of opportunistic behavior 
on the part of economic actors; but it might just as well have the opposite effect, by interfering, 
sometimes in arbitrary ways, with the performance of voluntary transactions, by restricting 
competition (central for trust-building market mechanisms), and by providing incentives for 
                                                 
18 The whole perspective presented here is akin to that of Ratnapala (2003), who introduces the term “moral capital” 
and pays particular attention to its evolutionary character and how it is stimulated by commerce given the existence 
of formal legal institutions that codify rules of procedural justice. 
  9rent-seeking (see e.g. Stigler 1988). An unclear net effect obtains here as well. This is 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Hypotheses on the Relationship between the areas of EFI and Trust 
Type of economic freedom  Expected effect  Motivation 
EFI1 Size of government   -/+  hinder trust-building market mechanisms through taxation; 
provide trust-enhancing goods such as judicial system and 
education 
EFI2 Legal structure and 
security of property rights 
+  provide assurance that opportunists are punished 
EFI3 Access to sound money   +  stimulate voluntary contracts and the trust that stems from such 
voluntary activities 
EFI4 Freedom to exchange 
with foreigners  
-/+  make citizens segmented and suspicious; make citizens realize that 
others are capable of displaying the same good behavior as 
domestic people 
EFI5 Regulation of credit, 
labor, and business  
-/+  could dampen opportunistic behavior; could hamper competition 
and breed rent-seeking 
 
 
3.   Empirical Strategy and Data 
 
Our empirical strategy consists of testing whether the five areas of economic freedom 
affects Trust in a statistically significant manner, and of using instrumental variables in order to 
see if there is some exogenous influence of EFI2 Legal structure and security of property rights 
on Trust.  
    Our views, as developed in the preceding section, are not uncontroversial. For example, it 
has been argued that trust leads to higher legal quality rather than the other way around. 
Uslaner (2002, pp. 218–9) boldly claims that “[t]rusting societies develop strong legal systems 
that gain the confidence of citizens. The opposite dynamic – strong legal systems leading to 
greater trust – does not hold.” (Italics in original.) Along similar lines, La Porta et al. (1997) find 
that Trust affects “the efficiency of the judiciary” in a positive and statistically significant way 
(however, only OLS and one control variable, GNP per capita, are used), and Bjørnskov (2004) 
finds that Trust exerts a positive and statistically significant influence (at the 10 per cent level) 
  10on EFI2. The recurring claim in these studies is that an efficient legal system is easier to establish 
and maintain in countries where people trust each other.19 We consider this story questionable. 
Trust may be a valuable asset in the process of political decision-making, but there is also less 
need for a well-functioning legal system in high-trusting countries. Many legal systems also 
originate from times when the political process was considerably less democratic than today. 
Arguably, generalized trust is less important when a small elite makes political decisions. In the 
end the question is an empirical one, and we think that our instruments do well compared with 
previous attempts.  
We follow articles by Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) 
that have popularized a group of historical and geographical variables as instruments for 
economic institutions, such as the security of property rights. Hall and Jones (1999) observe that 
some historical and geographic features of a country influence productivity exclusively through 
their impact on the institutional and political environment. Following their study we use the 
distance from the equator (Latitude), the fraction of the population speaking English (Engfrac) 
or a major European language (Eurfrac) as instruments for EFI2.20 We also add two variables 
capturing colonial origin (UK colony and Spanish colony, discounted by the number of years 
since independence) to our set of instruments.21 While we cannot be completely certain that 
such instruments are otherwise unrelated to Trust, they have (to our knowledge) never been 
                                                 
19 On the more general argument that trust yields superior government performance (rather than the other way 
around), see e.g. Putnam (1993), Rice and Sumberg (1997), Knack (2002), and Uslaner (2002, ch. 7). Knack (2002, p. 
772) argues that there are three major ways in which social capital can improve government performance: “First, it 
can broaden governmental accountability, so that government must be responsive to citizens at large rather than to 
narrow interests. Second, it can facilitate agreement where political preferences are polarized. Third, it is associated 
with greater innovation in policymaking in the face of new challenges.” However, these factors may not be 
particularly relevant in the context of judicial performance, specifically. 
20 Unfortunately we cannot follow Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and use settler mortality as an 
instrument. Our sample is already small and it would be reduced to only 26 countries if we did so. While we must 
admit that Latitude is a more problematic instrument than settler mortality, it is comforting that the two variables are 
strongly correlated, as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson note.  
21 Note that in several of the former British colonies, such as Ghana, India, Malta, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Uganda, very 
few people speak English. 
  11suggested as explanations of Trust, and we definitely consider it worthwhile to make use of 
them in order to delve deeper into the neglected causality issues.22 
Among the variables in our data set are measures of trust and economic freedom for 51 or 
52 countries, depending on the empirical specification. We present the variables by dividing 
them into six groups: 
 
•  Trust: the percentage of respondents in each country agreeing with the statement “most 
people can be trusted” rather than with the alternative “you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people” (earlier versions of the WVS) or “you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people” (the latest, fourth version of the WVS).23 The WVS has been 
conducted in 1981, 1990–91, 1995–96, and 1999−2002 (see Inglehart et al. 2000, 2004). For 
each country, we use the first non-missing value in the two latest versions of the WVS. 
We include additional values for Greece from the Eurobarometer survey and for New 
Zealand from a government survey24.25 
•  Economic freedom: the five areas of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the 
World Index, viz. EFI1 Size of government, EFI2 Legal structure and security of property 
rights, EFI3 Access to sound money, EFI4 Freedom to exchange with foreigners, and EFI5 
Regulation of credit, labor, and business. All variables of the EFI range from 0 (“no 
economic freedom”) to 10 (“full economic freedom”).  We use values from 1990. The 
index is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix and, in further detail, at 
                                                 
22 Knack and Keefer (1997) do not use instrumental variables when trying to explain trust. Interestingly, in a footnote 
(p. 1262) they report results from a growth regression in which latitude is used as an instrument for trust. But they do 
not include their institutional variables “Executive constraints” or “Independence of courts” in that regression. 
23 We do not think this change is of any importance for our study. Furthermore, Glaeser et al. (2000) report that the 
quoted question from the WVS in fact measures trustworthiness rather than trust. However, for our purposes this will 
be of minor concern as long as trust and trustworthiness are correlated positively across countries. 
24 See Zak and Knack (2001, p. 307). 
25 The questions were virtually identical in all these surveys. Whilst we cannot rule out a framing effect – i.e. that the 
replies to the identical questions differed because of differences between the surveys overall – we think this risk is 
small. In the WVS itself there is a similar, small risk that the comparability between countries is not perfect, stemming 
from the fact that the questions are asked in different languages which may entail different interpretations of certain 
terms (such as “most people”). 
  12<http://www.freetheworld.com>. de Haan and Sturm (2000) and Paldam (2003) 
consider the EFI to be a good indicator of institutional development and quality. 
•  Instruments for EFI2 Legal structure and security of property rights: the distance from 
the equator (Latitude), the fraction of the population speaking English (Engfrac) as their 
mother tongue, or who speaks a major European language (Eurfrac), as well as dummy 
variables for colonial origin (UK colony and Spanish colony) discounted by the number 
of years since independence.  
•  Control variables: PPP-adjusted gross domestic product per capita in 1990 (GDP90), the 
share of people who has completed secondary school (Schooling), the Gini coefficient of 
income inequality 1980–95 (Gini), religious fractionalization (Fractionalization), the share 
of the population belonging to a hierarchical religion, defined as Catholicism, Islam or 
Christian Orthodox (Religion), and the share of people younger than 35 (Young). 
 
The six control variables have generally been found to be related to Trust. Income (GDP90) 
raises Trust according to empirical studies by Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack 
(2001). In Zak and Knack’s theoretical model, trust is defined as time not spent verifying the 
actions of others. For someone who earns lots of money, it is more attractive to work and trust 
than taking the time to verify. Education (Schooling) fosters Trust according to several studies 
(Knack and Keefer 1997; Schneider et al. 1997; Rothstein and Stolle 2002, 2003; Knack and Zak 
2002).  Apart from the effects of learning and socialization, education can also be positively 
related to Trust since it proxies wages and subjective rates of time preferences (as noted by Zak 
and Knack 2001). Two measures of social distance (Gini and Fractionalization) are included 
since familiarity seems to breed trust. The empirical studies to this effect include Knack and 
Keefer (1997), Glaeser et al. (2000), Zak and Knack (2001), Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), Uslaner 
(2002, 2003), and Knack and Zak (2003). Following La Porta et al. (1997), we also control for 
hierarchical religions (Religion) suspecting that Catholics, Muslims, and followers of the 
Orthodox Church are less willing to trust people in general. Finally, we include the age variable 
Young. Putnam (1995) and others have reported that young Americans are dramatically less 
trusting than their elders. However, Rothstein and Stolle (2002, 2003) find that among Swedes 
the reverse is true. 
  13Some further clarifications, descriptive statistics, and sources of the variables are given in 
Table A2 in the Appendix. Values for EFI2 and Trust are listed in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
 
 
4.   Results 
 
We run cross-country regressions for the 1990s to investigate the following: which kind of 
economic freedom correlates with Trust?; and can economic freedom be explained by history 
and geography and if so, can we use such circumstances to investigate the impact of economic 
freedom on Trust?26  
 
The Five Areas of the EFI 
 
One of the advantages with using the EFI is that we can systematically investigate if 
certain economic institutions are more important for the formation of Trust than others. Judging 
from Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001), as well as from our own theoretical 
considerations, we would especially expect area 2 Legal structure and security of property 
rights to be most closely related to Trust, and this is confirmed when we regress Trust on the 
five areas of the EFI.  
 
                                                 
26 Throughout the investigation we get very similar results if we instead use data on trust that exclude the latest 
version of the WVS together with EFI data from 1985.  
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  1  2 3 4 5 6 
EFI1 Size of government  −1.107 
(1.308) 
0.353 
(1.213)   
    
EFI2 Legal structure and 





   




  1.854** 
(0.877) 
  




   1.730 
(1.502) 
 
EFI5 Regulation of credit, 
labor, and business 
3.933 
(2.462) 
    4.336** 
(1.981) 






















































































The dependent variable is Trust; for each country the last non-missing of the 1995 and 2000 observations. EFI1–5 are 
values from 1990. The regressions include a constant term. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
Column 1 reveals that two areas of the EFI display statistically significant coefficients: EFI2 
Legal structure and property rights (at the five percent level) and EFI3 Access to sound money 
(at the ten percent level). The former coefficient is about twice as large as the latter, suggesting 
that an increase in the quality of the legal structure of one unit entails an increase in Trust of 3.5 
percentage points. As the five areas of the EFI are added individually to the control variables, in 
columns 2−6, both EFI2 Legal structure and property rights and EFI3 Access to sound money are 
  15statistically significant (at the 5 percent level). EFI5 Regulation of credit, labor, and business, 
which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Economic institutions are related to the 
prevalence of Trust. 
Most control variables enter with the expected signs. Especially Fractionalization, 
economic inequality (Gini), and Religion appear to decrease trust.   
For several reasons, we will in the following concentrate on the second area of the EFI (see 
Table A4 in the Appendix for a more detailed specification of this variable). EFI2 has the largest 
of the statistically significant coefficients in the first column of Table 2. Figure 2 plots Trust and 
EFI2, depicting a positive relationship. Moreover, the empirical importance of EFI2 confirms the 
relevance of variables such as independence of courts, which Knack and Keefer (1997) find to be 
strongly related to Trust. By focusing on EFI2 we are able to relate to previous studies. The final 
reason for working with EFI2 is that Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001) have popularized a group of historical and geographical variables as 
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EFI2 Legal structure and security of property rights (1990)
 
Figure 2. Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights and Trust 
 
  16Instrumenting Legal Structure 
 
In this section we use instrumental variables to isolate the link from Legal structure and 
security of property rights to Trust. Our five instruments for EFI2 are Latitude, Engfrac, Eurfrac, 
UK Colony, and Spanish Colony. We confirm the relevance of our instruments by letting them 
explain EFI2 in a multiple regression. The coefficient of determination is then 0.64, increasing to 
0.81 if we include the six control variables that were used to explain Trust in Table 2.27 
Identification, i.e. the exclusion of the instruments in the second stage regression, is harder to 
establish. Assuming that the instruments are not otherwise − either directly or by correlation 
with some omitted variables − related to Trust seems somewhat heroic, but neither is it obvious 
that there must be a hidden link between Trust and such basic country characteristics. To reduce 
any remaining correlation between EFI2 and the error term we include the same control 
variables as in Table 2. In any case the instruments pass Sargan’s test of overidentifying 
restrictions, i.e. we cannot reject that the additional instruments are exogenous, given that one 
instrument is truly so. Obviously this does not resolve the causality issues, but however 
preliminary our analysis, treating EFI2 as endogenous takes the investigation a step forward.   
Table 3 compares OLS and 2SLS estimation results when EFI2 Legal structure and security 
of property rights is the only included area of the EFI. The estimated impact of EFI2 on Trust is 
larger, albeit not statistically significant, when EFI2 is instrumented with basic country 
characteristics. Thus OLS does not seem to overestimate the impact of EFI2 on Trust. In fact, the 
exogeneity of EFI2 is not rejected by a Durbin-Wu-Hausman-test, suggesting that the more 
efficient OLS estimates might be preferable. 
 
                                                 
27 The fit is substantially lower if we regress the other four areas of the EFI on the same instruments.    
  17Table 3. Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights and Trust: OLS and 2SLS 
 OLS  2SLS 


































  The dependent variable is Trust; for each country the last non-missing of the 1995 and 2000 observations. The 
values of EFI2 are from 1990. In the second column (2SLS), EFI2 is instrumented by Latitude, Engfrac, Eurfrac, UK 
colony, Spanish colony, and the six control variables given in the table. The first stage estimates are reported in Table 
A5 in the Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions include a constant term.. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, ** at the 5 percent, and *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
5   Concluding Remarks 
 
It has been argued that social capital, interpreted as generalized trust, has many beneficial 
effects, e.g. on economic growth, trade, political involvement, health, happiness and other 
important goals. By regarding trust as at least partly a function of institutions and policies, we 
make use of the Economic Freedom Index to see whether the core elements of market economies 
help form trust. It turns out that in particular one such element does, viz. Legal structure and 
security of property rights (EFI2) – an important insight, not least for developing nations lacking 
in this particular institutional area. That EFI2 stimulates Trust is easy to understand. By 
providing a legal system and by exercising it in an impartial, just, and general manner, 
  18economic actors know that voluntary contracts are enforceable and can be relied upon. This 
enables them to trust other actors more directly; but there is also an indirect effect in that the 
economic process of exchange, with its incentives and mechanisms for dispositions of trust to 
emerge, is stimulated.  
Access to sound money (EFI3) also turns out to be positively related to Trust, albeit to a 
smaller degree, as is Regulation of credit, labor, and business (EFI5), at least in one empirical 
specification. 
In conducting our study, we have made use of new data on Trust from the World Values 
Survey that enable us to include more countries than previous studies, hence improving the 
quality of the results. 
The empirical literature on social capital suffers from certain methodological problems, 
one being the unclear causality between (in our case) EFI2 and Trust. We try to pay particular 
attention to this issue by using instrumental variables. Our findings suggest that there is a role 





Table A1.The Areas, Components, and Subcomponents of the Economic Freedom Index 
1 Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises  
A General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption  
B Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP  
C Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP  
D Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies)  
2 Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights  
A Judicial independence: The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or  
parties in disputes  
B Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of  
government actions or regulation  
C Protection of intellectual property  
D Military interference in rule of law and the political process  
E Integrity of the legal system  
  193 Access to Sound Money  
A Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average annual growth of real  
GDP in the last ten years  
B Standard inflation variability in the last five years  
C Recent inflation rate  
D Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad  
4 Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners  
A Taxes on international trade  
i Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports  
ii Mean tariff rate  
iii Standard deviation of tariff rates  
B Regulatory trade barriers.  
i Hidden import barriers: No barriers other than published tariffs and quotas  
ii Costs of importing: The combined effect of import tariffs, licence fees, bank fees, and the time  
required for administrative red-tape raises costs of importing equipment by (10 = 10% or less; 0 = 
more than 50%)  
C Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size.  
D Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate  
E International capital market controls  
i Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to domestic capital markets  
ii Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners – index  
of capital controls among 13 IMF categories.  
  205 Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business  
A Credit Market Regulations  
i Ownership of banks: Percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks  
ii Competition: Domestic banks face competition from foreign banks   
iii Extension of credit: Percentage of credit extended to private sector  
iv Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real interest rates  
v Interest rate controls: Interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are freely determined by  
the market  
B Labor Market Regulations  
i Impact of minimum wage: The minimum wage, set by law, has little impact on wages because it is 
too  
low or not obeyed  
ii Hiring and Þ ring practices: Hiring and firing practices of companies are determined by private  
contract  
iii Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining  
iv Unemployment Benefits: The unemployment benefits system preserves the incentive to work  
v Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel  
C Business Regulations  
i Price controls: Extent to which businesses are free to set their own prices  
ii Administrative conditions and new businesses: Administrative procedures are an important 
obstacle  
to starting a new business   
iii Time with government bureaucracy: Senior management spends a substantial amount of time  
dealing with government bureaucracy  
iv Starting a new business: Starting a new business is generally easy   
v Irregular payments: Irregular, additional payments connected with import and export permits,  
business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan applications are very  
rare  
Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2003, pp. 8−9)  
 
Table A2. Variable Specifications and Descriptive Statistics  




Min Max Sources 
Trust  Percent trusting most people, the last non-missing 
of the 1995 and 2000 observations 
52 28.58  15.09  3  66.5  WVS, 
ZK 
EFI1   Size of government, in 1990  51  4.97  1.59  1.2  8.3  GL 
EFI2   Legal structure and security of property rights,  in  52  6.15  1.99  2.4  8.3  GL 
  21  1990 (in 1995 for Russia) 
EFI3  
 
Access to sound money,  in 1990  51  6.44  2.70  0  9.7  GL 
EFI4   Freedom to exchange with foreigners, in 1990 (in 
1995 for Russia) 
51 6.27  1.65  2.3  8.9  GL 
EFI5   Regulation of credit, labor, and business, in  1990  52  516  1.05  2.5  6.8  GL 
GDP90  PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in 1990 (in 1991 for 
Bulgaria and Russia) 
52 9.65  6.71  .60  23.00  PWT 
Schooling  Percent who have completed secondary school in 
the total population 
52 16.28  10.66  1.3  44.4  BL 
Gini 
 
Gini index of income distribution: average over the 
observations closest to 1980, 1990, and 1995 (the 
earlier observation in case of a tie). We only use 
observations that are included (i.e. coded “accept”, 
“nn”, or “est”). When there are different measures 
to choose between, we choose household over 
person and net income over gross income. 
52  36.39 8.94  22.45 58.69 DS 
Fractionali-
zation 
Index of religious fractionalization  52  0.41  0.25  0  0.86  A 
Religion  Percent Catholic + percent Muslim + percent 
Christian Orthodox, in 2000 
52 59.24  37.00  0.57  104.37  WCD 
Young  Percentage of a country’s population younger than 
35 years 
52 59.11  12.32  44.4  82.6  USBC 
Latitude 
 
Absolute value of the distance from the equator 
(degrees)  
52 35.49  16.83  1  64  PT,  CIA 
Engfrac  Fraction of a country’s population that speaks 
English as a native language 
52  0.10 0.28 0  0.97 PT,  E 
Eurfrac  Fraction of a country’s population that speaks 
English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish 
52 0.38  0.45  0  1  PT,  E 
UK colony 
 
Dummy variable (equal to one if the country is a 
former UK colony) * [250 - (1996 - year of 
independence)]/250 
52  0.17 0.32 0  0.92 PT 
Spanish 
colony 
Dummy variable (equal to one if the country is a 
former colony of Spain or Portugal) * [250 - (1996 - 
year of independence)]/250 
52  0.06 0.14 0  0.79 PT 
WVS = World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2000, 2004); ZK = Zak and Knack (2001); GL = Gwartney and 
Lawson (2003) <http://www.freetheworld.com>; PWT = Heston et al. (2002); BL = Barro and Lee (2000); DS = 
  22Deininger and Squire (1996) <http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm>; A = Alesina et al. 
(2003); WCD = World Christian Database http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/, population from Heston et 
al. (2002); USBC = U.S. Bureau of the Census, International  Data Base 
<http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbpyr.html/; PT = Persson and Tabellini (2003); CIA = The World Factbook 
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>; E = Ethnologue: Languages of the World 
<http://www.ethnologue.com/web.asp>. 
  The components of the five areas of the EFI are specified in Table A1 in this Appendix.  
  The components of the EFI, as well as weighting schemes, have changed in the various editions that have been 
published. Hence, when comparing studies, one needs to be careful to clarify which editions are used. 
 
Table A3. Data for EFI2 and Trust 
Country EFI2 Trust 
Denmark 8.3  66.5 
Sweden 8.3  66.3 
Norway 8.3  65 
China 5.8  54.5 
Indonesia 4.7  51.6 
New Zealand  8.3  48 
Japan 7.7  43.1 
Taiwan 7.2  42 
India 4.4  41 
Australia 7.9  39.9 
Canada 8.3  38.8 
Egypt 3.5  37.9 
Switzerland 8.3  37 
Spain 7.2  36.2 
USA 8.3  35.8 
Ireland 7.7  35.2 
Germany 8.3  34.8 
Austria 8.3  33.9 
Italy 7.7  32.6 
Pakistan 2.7  30.8 
Belgium 8.3  30.7 
Netherlands 8.3  29.8 
UK 7.7  29.8 
Finland 8.3  28 
  23Jordan 4  27.7 
Korea 5.4  27.3 
Bulgaria 7.2  26.9 
Dominican Republic  5.3  26.4 
Czech Republic  7.2  23.9 
Greece 6.8  23.7 
Russia 3.4  23.7 
Bangladesh 2.4  23.5 
Ghana 5.8  23 
Chile 6.2  22.8 
France 7.7  22.2 
Uruguay 6.3  22 
Hungary 7.2  21.8 
Mexico 6.8  21.3 
Poland 6.2  18.9 
Venezuela 5.7  15.9 
Turkey 4.5  15.7 
Argentina 6  15.4 
Zimbabwe 4  11.9 
South Africa  2.9  11.8 
Algeria 3.5  11.2 
Peru 2.9  10.7 
Romania 6.3  10.1 
Colombia 3.4  10 
Portugal 7.7  10 
Philippines 2.4  8.4 
Uganda 2.4  7.6 
Brazil 6.2  3 
 
Table A4. Components of and Sources for EFI2 Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
Components Sources 
A Judicial independence.the judiciary is independent and not 
subject to interference by the government or parties in disputes. 
World Economic Forum (2000, 2003) 
B Impartial courts: a trusted legal framework exists for private 
businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or 
regulation. 
World Economic Forum (2000, 2003); 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) 
  24C Protection of intellectual property  World Economic Forum (2001, 2003) 
D Military interference in rule of law and the political process  PRS Group (various issues); Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) 
E Integrity of the legal system.   PRS Group (various issues) 
  Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2003, pp. 25-26) 
 





















UK colony  0.235 
(0.648) 






* indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, ** at the 5 percent, and *** at the 1 percent level. 
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